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THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN CRIMINOLOGY
STEPHEN SCHAFER*
Hardly any intellectual or practical discipline is in
a more confused state at present than criminology,
and fundamental questions about the nature of
crime and punishment remain to confound and
should often embarrass the thinker. Crime has been
intensively studied for more than a century, but it
is doubtful whether we are now much nearer to an
understanding of man's criminal conduct. It appears
that a considerable amount of theoretical work
remains to be done, in particular on the problem
of the freedom of the will. However complicated
it might be for various scientific and ethical reasons,
an ideological stand should be taken that may
serve as a foundation on which empirical research
can be more intelligently built. Without such a
base, the contemporary turmoil over the crime
problem may provide ample scope for criminological
mischief.
The issue of free will seldom features in con-
ventional criminology textbooks or among titles in
professional journals, nor does this profoundly
critical problem receive attention in research reports.
Yet, a tour d'horizon of the immense volume of
empirical investigations seems to indicate a covert
suggestion that a deterministic inclination-or even
strategy-characterizes the work of the quantifying
researchers of our time. This is not to say that
they would overtly state or even consciously assume
that we have no free choice and that our conduct
is determined only by external forces, whether
superhuman, social or other powers, which anni-
hilate the human will. It may be the case that
while they lean toward determinism, present re-
searchers do not even contemplate the problem of
free will; in attempts to follow the nineteenth-
century scientific thinking about the concept of
causality they are so obsessed with techniques em-
ploying numbers and tables that they lose sight of
basic qualitative issues. For many years quantita-
tive research has been a flourishing industry in
which both the funding agencies and the investi-
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gators, with some exceptions, place heavy emphasis
on the correct construction and use of statistical
and methodological rules, clouding the preference
for deterministic quantifying techniques by paying
lip service to the promise of theoretical propositions.
This is one of the major reasons that the dis-
tinction between accidental and causal regularities
has been much too often missed or misinterpreted.
Only through skepticism and its attendant sense of
the difficulty of understanding what one sees can one
sustain anything like equanimity and avoid cynicism
and despair.
There is, beyond doubt, a great benefit from ob-
serving and recording man's behavior, and it is not
intended to deflect attention from the many solid
virtues of a deterministic kind- of quantifying; yet
there is a danger in accepting these records without
making efforts to resolve the relevant theoretical
issues. It hardly needs saying that the roots of crime
are buried much deeper and their ramifications are
vastly more complicated than is usually acknowl-
edged by our deterministically-oriented quantifying
researchers, who do not explain why this stand on
the problem of free will has been taken. This might
be one of the reasons so many of these projects,
and even their topics, are remarkably superficial, a
deficiency which leads them to a banal conclusion.
There are many theoretical problems, a major one
being the issue of the freedom of the will, which
make a critic cautious about lightly accepting those
numbers and figures.
The problem of man's free will is critically im-
.portant to criminological views, despite its almost
insoluble nature and the inordinate Sisyphean intel-
lectual labor required even to take sides in the cen-
turies-old dispute. Three hundred years ago Gott-
fried Wilhelm Leibniz simply called it "the great
question,"' and Nicolas Malebranche viewed it as a
"mystery"; I two centuries ago Immanuel Kant,
'G. LEIBNIZ, NOVA METHODus DOCENDAE DISCEN-
DAE GUEJUiSs PRUDENTIAE (1686).
IN. MALENBRANCHE, DE LA RECHERCHE DE LA
VfRITg, OU L'ON TRAITE DE LE NATURE DE L'ESPRIT DE
L'HOMME ET DE L'USAGE QU'IL EN Dorr FAVE POUR
EUITER L'ERREUR DONS LES SCIENCES (1675).
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historically the first to expose this problem as a con-
frontation between science and ethics, bitterly com-
plained that a thousand years' work had been ex-
pended in vain on its solution,' and Jonathan
Edwards saw it as the "grand question" that can be
approached only with "candor and calm attention." "
In the twentieth century Nicolai Hartmann found it
the real exemplum crucis of ethics, the perfect solu-
tion of which at the present time. cannot be ex-
pected; 'and Heinrich Gomperz has called attention
to the fact that conservative and liberal thinkers, in-
consistently and illogically with respect to their
ideology, tend to reverse their traditional stand on
the problem. 6 Indeed, as M. R. Ayers expressed it,
"The freewill problem is certainly the heaviest mill-
stone around the neck of anyone who inquires into
the nature of potentiality." 
7
On this account it should not be surprising that
nothing is further from these thoughts than lightly
offering a solution to this troublesome and perplex-
ing "grand mystery." But while this writing has
none of the comprehensiveness or coherence sug-
gested by its title, it is the purpose of this paper to
point to this problem as the pivotal question of
criminology, so sadly neglected by many who ven-
ture to treat the struggling issue of crime. The prob-
lem of the freedom of will-often called freedom of
action ' or the freedom of the self-actually mirrors
the interminable debate on the controversial issue of
causality in terms of determinism against indeter-
minism, ultimately leading to the question of man's
freedom of choice in acting or in general behaving
himself, and to his consequent responsibility for his
conduct. Determinism suggests that man's will-
if there is such a thing as "will"-does not motivate
action and that our conduct results from extraneous
sources. Indeterminism, however, suggests that
because the human will is not motivated by physical
and environmental factors, man can do anything
he wants to do; if "will" did not exist, causal reality
would be an illusion.
It is clear from the legion of arguments that an
unconditional acceptance of the law of causality (de-
terminism) would be as grandiose an hypothesis as
I I. KANT, KRITIK DER PRAxTISCHEN JERNUNFT (1788).
'J. EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE WILL (1754).
5N. HARTMANN, ETHIK 572-79 (2d ed. 1935).
6 H. GOMPERZ, DAS PROBLEM DER WILLENS FREICHEIT
3-11 (1907).
1M. AYERS, THE REFUTATION OF DEFERMINISM: AN
ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 1 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as AYERS].
'ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION at vii (T. Honderich
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ESSAYS].
would be the endorsement of unlimited free will
(indeterminism) as a metaphysical concept. Should
the determinists be correct, criminals, as we under-
stand them now, would not exist, since all impulses
from which actions stem are irresistable and con-
sequently only the determining extraneous physical
and environmental factors ought to be blamed for
crime. Punishing, correcting, or reforming man
would be an illogical and meaningless effort. On the
other hand, should the indeterminists be right, since
culpability is based on "willingness" to commit
crimes, punishment ought to be equal for all crimi-
nals, unless the value of the criminally-attacked
target could in itself justify distinctions. Since man
willed his action, and could have acted other-
wise, he would be fully and exclusively responsible
for his choice of violating the law, regardless of
the conduct of his victim and irrespective of his
social and physical environment. All empirical re-
search projects in criminology would be rendered
meaningless.
The assumption underlying all penal systems
seems at first glance to be indeterministic. The
philosophy of officially punishing the criminal law-
breaker indicates the lawmaker's premise that the
criminal had freedom of choice, and that this choice
was to commit a crime. Criminal law assumes that
man has freedom of action and, as Morris Ginsberg
contended, he is able to form a "more or less impar-
tial judgment of the alternative actions" and can act
"in accordance with that judgment." 9 Ted Hon-
derich poses the thesis that to say that something
can happen in a given situation is to say that some-
thing else is not "caused" to happen. 10 It would be
pointless, so the argument runs, to offer the option of
reward or punishment if the freedom of choice were
not a fact. Criminal law, it appears, operates on sev-
eral presumptions: (1) that we humans have the free
will to decide our action, (2) that we are intelligent
and reasoning creatures who can recognize values
(whatever the term "value" may cover) and (3) that
we can distinguish between right and wrong (what-
ever these terms may mean). In other words, crimi-
nal law seems to assume that only those persons
who will to commit a crime or neglect to will other-
wise can and should be punished. They should be di-
rectly responsible for what they will to do, and they
should be held responsible for being careless or negli-
gent in not willing to avoid crime.
At the same time, criminological research, mainly
9M. GINSBURG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 168 (1965).
"ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 202.
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the quantifying kind in the last three decades, seems
to assume the power of external forces which do not
allow man freely to exercise his will and makes the
actions of the criminal agent causally explicable. As
seen in the so-called prediction studies, "it can be
known a priori that every event has a cause;" " ac-
cordingly, in contrast to the practice of the adminis-
tration of criminal law, empirical investigators may
be seen reaching for the proposition that nobody is
ever really, or at least not fully, responsible for his
actions. In their search for a cure for crime they be-
lieve that crimes, at least most of them, are unfree
and involuntary actions, and, although the crimes
are obviously not reflexes, they are committed
against the will of their performers: 12 with certain
regularities, extraneous influences actually deter-
mine or guide the lawbreakings. What the empirical
researchers really say is that if something does not
happen in a given situation it means that something
else is caused to happen; they give the impression of
actively looking for guilty factors other Chan the crim-
inal himself. However, even their deterministically-
flavored research would prove to be purposeless
should the totalitarianistic and strictly determinis-
tically-thinking behavior modificators be correct;
whatever deterministic external factors might be re-
vealed by the researchers, in the behavior modifiers'
Fourier-type phalansteries, such technical brain-
washing-or, more correctly, "will-washing"-
would take place under the pretext of punishment
or treatment which makes any research result irrele-
vant and would overpower all kinds of external
forces by determining the choice of man. The deter-
minist behavior modificators seem to be more de-
terministic than are the deterministic researchers.
Unless we are ready to deny that freedom is one of
the higher attributes of man, and discarding the phil-
osophical and theological aspects of the behavior
modificators' ideas which prefer evil to good, the
chances of reaching the solution of the problem of
free will are necessarily slim. Are we wholly a part
of the natural world so that our actions are the neces-
sary outcome of causal processes, or are our actions
free so that we can be held responsible for them? Can
we suggest that only one of these questions has an
answer which would deny the validity of any answer
to the other? As materialistic monism concludes in
strict determinism, spiritual monism leads to an
IAYERS, supra note 7, at 3.
"
2
J. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATION 116 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
PLAMENATZ].
absolute indeterminism; and they are so formidably
in opposition to each other that neither of them
would tolerate the other in the arena of a single
monistic view. Many philosophical ideologies tend to
divide the human universe into two parts: the world
of empirical realities (mundus sensibilis), on the one
hand, and the world of values and ideas (mundus
intelligibilis) on the other; but apparently, these
ideological views do not offer room for strict indeter-
minism in the former world and for strict determi-
nism in the latter world. Any monistic view would
expose the two independent worlds to an unavoid-
able and confusing clash, and man would be tor-
mented by not recognizing which of them is his
real world. Thus, since man could hardly exist in two
independent worlds at the same time, only with a
dualistic view can human society function where
man's position and role in this functioning universe
demand the merger of the two worlds. Victor Cath-
rein contends that the freedom of the human will
does not make the acceptance of the laws of causality
impossible; '3 and Constantin Gutberlet claims that
the will is so strongly subjugated to causal laws
that if this were the only question in the debate of
determinism and indeterminism, then even his own
indeterministic stand could be qualified as a deter-
ministic view. 14 Gyula Mo6r also supports the
dualistic outlook by suggesting that in the willed
choice the idea of value plays an important role since
man has the capability of choosing and his choices
may develop causal effects. "
This is why, as it appears, only a moderate de-
terminism or a moderate indeterminism (the former
with a limited range of causality, the latter with
an arrested freedom of will) offers at least some an-
swer to the problem of "free will." From a pragmatic
point of view, and in order to approach the crime
issue somewhat more safely, usable answers have to
contain a mixture of both the indeterministic and the
deterministic elements. They differ primarily in
terms of how much of each element fills in such a
compromise. An estimate of the volume of freedom of
will (in other words, the relative dominance of the
deterministic or the indeterministic view in judging
crime) may be necessary because there is no philo-
sophical guarantee either that the adherents of the in-
deterministic view possess a real freedom of will in
reaching their conclusion or that the supporters of
1
3
V. CATHREIN, DAS STRAFRECHT DER ZUKUNFT 366-
67 (1896).
11C. GUTBERLET, DIE WILLENS FREIHEIT UND IHRE
GEGNER 23 (2d ed. 1907).
1G. MOOR, A SZABAD AKARAT PROBLPNIAJA 8 (1943).
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the deterministic thesis express their judgment only
as mouthpieces of external forces. "Compatilism,"
the coexistence of the two independent worlds of
freedom and physical determinism, is often proposed,
but "incompatilism," the inability of these two
worlds to coexist, is even more often contended.
Yet in a dualistic view only "libertarianism" and
not "necessitarianism" seems to offer a viable foun-
dation for judging a person's action or conduct, a
position which leans toward freedom but saves deter-
ministic causality. This is without claiming the ab-
solute freedom of will which may lead to the liberum
arbitrium indifferentiae (where the will in a guide-
less position may fall into chaos) and without stating
the absolute rule of the causa finalis, the ultimate
cause, which is not really known. Under such an ab-
solute rule the determiniqic strength of competing
causes can be measured only ex post facto, since
obvioisly the one is the stronger that finally "wins"
and determines the action. 16
For the unsophisticated, determinism-and per-
haps even incompatilism-is more readily un-
derstandable than the freedom of will. It is easy for
him to assert that as something cannot come out of
nothing, everything must have a cause. But, contends
Plamenatz, "whereas it is not at all clear that he
requires an event always to have the same cause,
he does seem to require the former to be produced by
the latter in some sense which makes the causal law
something more than a necessity of succession
or concomitance." 17 This position, however, gives
rise to such questions as how the cause can produce
its effect if it ceases to exist at the moment when the
latter comes into existence. Determinism, by the na-
ture of its apparent logic, can be easier to compre-
hend than indeterminism where the will is less tangi-
ble and provable; yet even devoted determinists often
seem to feel a sort of fallacy in their view, and look
for a place for the freedom of choice. Sometimes they
even try to arrive at their deterministic position by
using the free will as a starting point for argument.
Heinrich Rickert, for example, clearly a determinist,
places the free will in a "prophysical" world, which
is supposed to be a metaphysical sphere that func-
tions before we become acquainted with the realities;
thus he adjusted the Aristotelian ideas in favor of the
will's freedom. 18 David Wiggins, a "reasonable
libertarian," complains against determinism by sug-
gesting that "if determinism is true and every ac-




PLAMENETZ, supra note 12, at 108.
11H. RICKERT, SYSTEM DER PHILOSOPHIC 201 (1921).
tion of every agent depends in its particular circum-
stances upon some specific physical condition being
satisfied, then actions cannot be torn free from the
nexus of physical effects and fully determining
causes." The agent thus could not have done other-
wise and, continues Wiggins, "if that is the charac-
ter of the causal nexus we live within, then it makes
no particular difference to this point whether or not
actions are identical with movements of matter." 19
While it is the belief of the libertarians that deter-
minism cannot operate in the real world without ac-
cepting the validity of indeterminism, and "it is char-
acteristic of the libertarian to insist that for at least
some of the things which the man with freedom
does, or plans, or decides to do, he must have a genu-
ine alternative open to him;" 20 strict indeterminism
does not exist. As Anthony Kenny pointed out, "the
fact that we can do what we want does not mean that
we can want what we want." 2 A fully indeter-
mined choice ought to be totally beyond the reach of
all influences, but, as was admitted even by the
staunch indeterminist Jonathan Edwards, because
the choice can be influenced, it can be determined
and therefore is not totally free choice. This might
be true even in the case of mental disease, as Anthony
Flew contrasted it with physical illness, since men-
tal derangement is culturally relative. 22 Jonathan
Edwards' free choice refers, for example, to asses
who can choose between alternative bales of hay. But
there is an important difference between asses and
men: when asses make their choice the issue of
moral responsibility, 'or moral blameworthiness or
praiseworthiness, does not appear in the question.
This is because asses are not moral agents, and
only moral agents can properly be subject to moral
judgment. What then is meant by a "moral agent"
in common speech and in the evaluation of the crimi-
nal law system? According to Edwards, a moral
agent is a being who satisfies two conditions. First,
he has a moral faculty, that is, he is capable of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong. And second,
he has the capacity to reason. The latter might be the
more important of the two conditions, since it makes
the agent subject to influences in his actions by
"moral inducements or motives," whether these in-
ducements take the form of commands, exhortations
or persuasive arguments. 2 In translating these
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theses and thoughts into the understanding of the
issue of crime, "it follows from these premises that
our actions are never free or voluntary," yet "the
theses of determinism.., are incompatible with the
existence of this responsibility." 24 Although Thomas
Hobbes is known as a determinist, at least a scien-
tific determinist, still in his description of "liberty"
a man can act freely even though he acted neces-
sarily and could not have acted otherwise. 25
However, in thesi, one may claim that even mod-
erate indeterminism does not exist and that, because
of the force of socialization processes, the will has no
freedom whatsoever. 26 The socializing measures de-
velop man's bias and prejudice, likes and dislikes,
beliefs and disbeliefs, affirmations and negations re-
garding the basic and guiding questions of the world
in which he is expected to live, to choose, to decide
and to function. The ideas of this world and the
prescriptions of the ruling social-political power are
infused into man before his faculties of knowing, rea-
soning, evaluating and choosing have had a chance to
develop to maturity. "[Prescribed socialization
makes the individual what he is." 2' 7 He knows,
reasons, assesses and makes his choices; but norm-
ally what he would will to know, how he would
will to reason, and what choices he would will to
make are influenced by the ideas socialized into him
and limited by the social-political power that in fact
dictates the range of his choices. Moreover, he is ex-
pected to will as other persons, who are more power-
ful than he, will him to will. He is not deprived of
his choices, and almost always he "can do other-
wise." But how many and which of these choices will
be at his disposal, what he can do otherwise, and
what he can want to want are influenced, limited and
arrested by the socialization processes, which in turn
are assumed to operate according to the influencing,
limiting and arresting prescriptive will of the ruling
power of the given world. The question, therefore, is
24 EssAYs, supra note 8, at 205, 208.
2 5T. HOBBS, ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY (1841).
2 0AYERS, supra note 7, at 4-5.
21S. SCHAFER, THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL: THE PROB-
LEM OF MORALITY AND CRIME 109 (1974).
not whether physically he can do otherwise; rather,
it is the question of whether he can will to do other-
wise. If the role of the socialization processes is posed
here correctly, he cannot will to do otherwise. Con-
sequently, it might be safe to say that man does have
a freedom of will, yet it is a will that has been in-
fluenced, limited, and arrested even before it has
evolved to the stage where man could will to will
freely.
A qualitative concentration on this point may
guide the quantifying researchers better to under-
stand what they are doing, and it may assist the
administrators of criminal law better to understand
what they are judging. Clearly, the less effective the
socialization process, the broader is the freedom of
man's will; and the more successful the socializing
operation, the narrower is the freedom of will and
the range of choices from which man can will his ac-
tions. Where the socialization process is weak, there
is more space to will an action that is qualified as
crime; where socialization is strong, only such ac-
tions can be willed which do not pull one into the
territory of criminality. The state of crime in differ-
ent cultures may support this proposition. In the
former alternative man may will to belong to a world
other than the one he inhabits under the rule of its
social-political power; in that case, he sees no
reason to restrain his will or not to will what he can
will, 28 and his undesirably extensive or even un-
limited freedom of will may create a potentiality of
crime or even a revolt against those dominating
social-political powers who will his freedom to be in-
fluenced, limited, and arrested by their reasons, as-
sessments and choices.
If the foregoing is true, is it correct to blame and
punish the criminal? Is he, rather than those who
failed correctly to influence, limit, and arrest his will,
really responsible for his crime; or are we making
him responsible? Do we, for example, have ju-
venile delinquents or criminal parents? As it ap-
pears, man does have a freedom of will, but one's
indeterminism, at least in its range, is determined by
other indeterminists.
28 Id. at 139-40.
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